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Press Release 29/03/2007 B001:07

Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board Publish Recommendations on the Design and Operation of Fuel Storage Sites

Today, the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB) is publishing its 5th report [PDF 887kb], required by the investigation terms of reference into the Buncefield incident on 11 December 2005.

The report makes recommendations to address improvements in the Design and Operation of sites in the UK that store and transfer petroleum products on a large scale, and responds to the MIIB’s term of reference 5 (see Notes to Editors).

The MIIB made clear in the Initial Report published on 13 July 2006, that design and operation of sites was one of its four main areas of concern in this investigation. The other areas of continuing work are emergency preparedness and response to incidents, advice to planning authorities and an examination of the HSE’s and the Environment Agency’s roles in regulating the activities on the Buncefield site.

On design and operations at storage sites, the paramount need is for precautions to be in place to prevent fuel escaping from the vessels in which it is contained. Further precautions are needed if fuel does escape, to prevent it forming a flammable vapour and stop pollutants contaminating the environment.

Lord Newton, the Chairman of the Buncefield Investigation Board said:

"This report challenges the industry to substantially strengthen safety standards at sites handling large quantities of fuel. It calls for a programme of revisions to guidance and standards for process safety, environmental protection and excellence in operations.

"It also calls for a more consistent response to broadly similar major hazard risks than are the case today. Specific recommendations are made for operators to rigorously assess levels of safety and reliability required in the design and operation of relevant sites. The Competent Authority needs to oversee this work and ensure it is done.

"In preparing this report we have also taken into account the work of others. In particular the Buncefield Standards Task Group has been working on aspects of design and operations, including those recommended in our Initial Report, and we welcome this initiative by the sector and the Competent Authority. Other sources have included industry specialists and experts, and the Baker Report on the Texas City incident in the USA.

"We also note striking similarities between some of our recommendations and those made last week by the US Chemical Safety Board on the Texas City incident."

Together these areas make up a comprehensive package to reduce risks to those who work on or near such sites, or live nearby, and to the communities and the natural environment that can be damaged by extreme events such as Buncefield.

Notes to Editors

  1. The Buncefield Investigation Board was appointed by the Health and Safety Commission (HSC) to supervise the investigation into the explosions and fire at the Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot, Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire, on 11 December 2005. The HSC directed the investigation using its powers under section 14(2)(a) of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, to be carried out jointly by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Environment Agency (EA). The Investigation Board is independent of HSE and EA, while including representatives of HSE and EA as well as independent experts. The Board is chaired by Lord Newton of Braintree.
  2. The Competent Authority manage and enforce the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations (COMAH) and comprise of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Environment Agency in England and Wales (EA), and the HSE and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency in Scotland.
  3. The Board’s 5th term of reference is to make recommendations for future action to ensure the effective management and regulation of major accident risk at COMAH sites. This should include consideration of off-site as well as on-site risks and consider prevention of incidents, preparations for response to incidents, and mitigation of their effects. In its initial report published in July 2006, the board set out three main areas of concern to be addressed under this TOR. On design and operations the Board has met with the Chair of the regulator/industry task group and had a number of its own detailed discussions to now issue this report. 
  4. The Buncefield Standard Task Group is the joint Competent Authority/ industry standards working group set up to review safety and environmental protection standards at fuel storage sites following the Buncefield incident.
  5. The main five areas in the Design and Operation Recommendations Report are:
    • The need for systematic assessment of the level of inherent safety required at sites;
    • The need for high integrity systems to protect against escape of fuel;
    • Preventing escalation of loss of primary containment incidents and preventing harmful substances from causing a major accident to the environment;
    • Operating major hazard sites with high reliability organisations; and
    • Improving culture and leadership to deliver high safety performance.
      Our broad aim is to catalyse improvements in the fuel storage sector so that it is continually alert to the major hazard potential of its operations.
  6. As stated in the Design and Operations report the MIIB has noted with interest the recent Baker Report, which has a number of recommendations and findings that align with the Board’s views arising from the Buncefield investigation. This particularly relates to recommendations on process safety leadership, process safety culture, performance indicators, independent monitoring, industry leadership, engineering practices, safety knowledge and industry competence.
  7. The primary investigation into whether any criminal offences have been committed is continuing. The investigators are required to follow all reasonable lines of enquiry. Once those enquiries are complete it is for the Environment Agency and the HSE to decide if there is sufficient evidence upon which to base a prosecution. In the meantime the MIIB must be careful to ensure that the fairness of any potential criminal proceedings is not jeopardised as this might upset the possibility of a prosecution should that prove appropriate.

To access the report on the Design and Operation of Fuel Sites at 12.00pm on 29.03.07 please go to www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk

For an advanced copy of the report (not to be published or broadcast before 12pm on Thursday 29 March 2007) or an interview with the Major Incident Investigation Board, please contact Suzanne Halls on 07971 186710.